<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Cv-Talk | Christian Knabenhans</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/tag/cv-talk/</link><atom:link href="https://cknabs.github.io/tag/cv-talk/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>Cv-Talk</description><generator>Hugo Blox Builder (https://hugoblox.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>End-to-End Encrypted Collaborative Documents</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/end-to-end-encrypted-collaborative-documents/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/end-to-end-encrypted-collaborative-documents/</guid><description/></item><item><title>A Privacy-Preserving Aid Distribution System with Assessment Capabilities; Or, a Case Study on Threat Modelling and System Design</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/a-privacy-preserving-aid-distribution-system-with-assessment-capabilities-or-a-case-study-on-threat-modelling-and-system-design/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/a-privacy-preserving-aid-distribution-system-with-assessment-capabilities-or-a-case-study-on-threat-modelling-and-system-design/</guid><description/></item><item><title>On the (Privacy) Harms of the EU Digital Identity Framework</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/on-the-privacy-harms-of-the-eu-digital-identity-framework/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/on-the-privacy-harms-of-the-eu-digital-identity-framework/</guid><description/></item><item><title>Coming Back from the Knowledge k-RISIS: Building Arguments from k-PRISIS</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/coming-back-from-the-knowledge-k-risis-building-arguments-from-k-prisis/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/coming-back-from-the-knowledge-k-risis-building-arguments-from-k-prisis/</guid><description/></item><item><title>On the Fiat-Shamir Security of Succinct Arguments from Functional Commitments</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/on-the-fiat-shamir-security-of-succinct-arguments-from-functional-commitments/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/on-the-fiat-shamir-security-of-succinct-arguments-from-functional-commitments/</guid><description/></item><item><title>Lova: Lattice-Based Folding Scheme from Unstructured Lattices</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/lova-lattice-based-folding-scheme-from-unstructured-lattices/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/lova-lattice-based-folding-scheme-from-unstructured-lattices/</guid><description/></item><item><title>Verifiable Fully Homomorphic Encryption / Towards Robust FHE for the Real World</title><link>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/verifiable-fully-homomorphic-encryption-/-towards-robust-fhe-for-the-real-world/</link><pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://cknabs.github.io/talk/verifiable-fully-homomorphic-encryption-/-towards-robust-fhe-for-the-real-world/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="verifiable-fully-homomorphic-encryption">Verifiable Fully Homomorphic Encryption&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is seeing increasing real-world deployment to protect data in use by allowing computation over encrypted data. However, the same malleability that enables homomorphic computations also raises integrity issues, which have so far been mostly overlooked for practical deployments. While FHE&amp;rsquo;s lack of integrity has obvious implications for correctness, it also has severe implications for confidentiality: a malicious server can leverage the lack of integrity to carry out interactive key-recovery attacks.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As a result, virtually all FHE schemes and applications assume an honest-but-curious server who does not deviate from the protocol. However, this assumption is insufficient for a wide range of deployment scenarios. While there has been work that aims to address this gap, current approaches fail to fully address the needs and characteristics of modern FHE schemes and applications.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this talk, I discuss the need for and challenges of achieving verifiable Fully Homomorphic Encryption (vFHE), introduce a notion for maliciously secure verifiable FHE, and present concrete instantiations based on several integrity primitives. This is joint work with Alexander Viand and Anwar Hithnawi.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>